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APPEARANCES AND REALITY.—I.
THE distinction between ' reality' and appearance, between what
a thing really is and what it appears to be, is fundamental to our
ordinary consciousness. Hence it is natural to make use of the
distinction in metaphysics, and the result is a tendenoy to maintain
one of two theories.
According to the first theory, we know things only as they
appear to as,- and not as they are in themselves. In particular
things are not really spatial or temporal, bnt only appear so to ns ;
space and time are only the appearances of a non-spatial reality.
According to the second theory, we know only ' phenomena ' or
' appearances,' certain elements within our own minds; reality
proper is beyond the mind and is not known at all. This view
sometimes, as in Kant, tries to treat the appearances as being
objects in space and time. We know them but not the thing in
itself.
These positions may be said to differ in degree of scepticism.
The former allows that reality is presented to us in perception, but
insists that its nature becomes distorted in the process. The latter
denies that reality is presented to us at all and substitutes for it
another object, viz., ' appearances '. Further these positions are
not always distinguished. Kant, for instance, states his view
Bometimes in the form ' we only know things as they appear to
us,' sometimes in the form ' we only know phenomena,' and he
fails to notice that the two statements are different. The truth is
that the first theory is a half-way house to the second. We are
forced to go from the first to the second to gain some object of
which it can be said that we know in the proper sense not only
that it is but what it is. But for all that the second theory is the
more sceptical, because it leaves the real object wholly unknown
and regards knowledge as about something else.
In both cases the result is reached by the use of the oommon
distinction between reality and appearance. The distinction re-
lates primarily to objects of vision, and therefore the justification
of its use in the theory of knowledge requires analysis of its nature
in its original application. Only such an analysis will reveal the
true nature of -the distinction, and consequently the legitimacy of
the theory of knowledge built upon it.
It will here be contended—
(1) That it is a certain analysis of the distinction which leads to
the first theory and thence to the second.
 at U







224 H. A. PRICHABD :
(2) That this is a mis-analysis and that the distinction really
understood leads to the contrary conclusion.
We can easily trace the origin of the view that we only know
things as they appear to us, by taking any case where we dis-
tinguish between ' appearance ' and ' reality '. Take, for example,
Plato's instance of a straight stick partly submerged in water,
which, as we say, looks bent, though in reality it is straight. If
some one knows nothing about refraction and confines himself to a
single perception, he will assert that the stick is bent; and if he is
asked why, he will answer, ' because I see it to be so'. But if
afterwards he sees the stick under other conditions and has learned
about refraction, he will say that the stiok only looks bent and is
really straight. Thus having just identified what the stick is and
what it looks, he afterwards draws a distinction between them.
And this distinction presents an obvious difficulty to knowledge
in general. If a thing is not necessarily what it looks, how are
we to learn what it really is ? A thing in the sense in question is
an individual; to get at-it therefore we must perceive it. But the
perception, to be of value, must give us the thing as it is. And
that it does so is implied by the original assertion ' the stick is
bent, because it is seen to be so '. Seeing is believing. The sub-
sequent assertion, however, denies this, •' the stick only looks bent,
but it is not what it lojks'. Perception, that is to say, does not
give us the thing as it really is. The conclusion at once seems to
follow that we only know things as they look or appear to us and
not as they are. And from this it is but a short step to the second
view that we only know 'appearances' or ' phenomena '.
To put the difficulty shortly. Access to things implies percep-
tion. Yet if perception only gives us things as they look and not
as they are, access to things as they are is impossible. But per-
ception does in fact only give us things as they look, for this is
presupposed by the distinction we actually draw between what
they look and what they are.
This conclusion can only be avoided by maintaining that the
reality of the distinction is still compatible with the position that
perception at least gives us things as they are in some qualified
way; that after all there is some identity between what things
look and what they are. And a closer analysis of the distinction
vindicates this identity.
That the analysis may be as concrete as possible, it will be well
to bear in mind three prominent types of case.
(1) That of refraction already mentioned.
(2) That due to the nature of perspective.
E.IJ. (1) Railway lines may be said though really parallel
to look convergent.
(2) A horizontal building may be said to look as
though it were lower in its more distant parts.
(3) That due to distance from the observer.
E.g., the moon may be said to look as large as the sun.
These types suggest that the distinction between appearance and
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APPEARANCES AND REALITY. 225
reality at least primarily relates to the spatial qualities of things.
The only exception seems to be the case of temporal relations ; we
certainly say that a certain event appeared to take a long time,
though it really did not.1 Again these cases bring before us by
way of contrast the existence of spheres of perception where the
distinction is wholly inapplicable, e.g., those of pain and sensation
generally. A pain is necessarily what I feel it to be; distinction
between what it is, and what I feel or perceive it as, is meaning-
less. Similarly a noise, in the sense of a sensation as distinct
from its physical conditions, is what I hear it as. In fact it is
just the absence of the distinction here that gives much of its
plausibility to the view that we only know phenomena. If we
once allow that our objects are states of ourselves, we seem unable
to deny that at least we apprehend them as they are, i.e., that we
really know phenomena.
We may now proceed to the analysis. The general form of
statement to be analysed is, ' a thing looks or appears so and so,
though we know that it is not so in reality '. The following seem
the main points:—
(1) Such a statement is in no sense about' appearances '.
For (a) its subject is not the appearance or look of the thing but
the thing. When I assert that the moon looks as large as the
sun, I make an assertion about the moon and not about its look.
(fit) Its predicate is always ' real,' i.e., it is always of a kind
appropriate to real things, as opposed to their look or appearance.
Thus the stick looks bent; the moon looks as large as the sun;
the ra>lway lines look convergent. If we seek for a predicate suit-
able to ' appearanoes,' we naturally think of such terms as ' decep-
tive ' and ' untrustworthy'.
Our statements then about appearances are expressed in the
same terms as the reality from which we distinguish them. It at
once follows—
(a) That statements about appearance imply that we at least
know enough about reality to say that real things have certain
possible predicates, e.g., bent or convergent. To deny this is to be
wholly unable to state how things look.
(b) That the issue involved in distinguishing appearance from
reality concerns not the general character of the attributes of real
things but their relation to a particular subject. The question is
not, ' Is convergence or bentness the attribute of any real thing ?'
but, ' Is it an attribute of particular real things, this stick or these
lines ?' •
It follows that the distinction between reality and appearance
relates solely to the details of our knowledge and not to its general
or structural character. The attributes of reality cannot belong
to yivr) different from those of appearance. Doubt about its details
implies certainty as to its general character.
1
' Appearing' and ' looking' arc treated as distinct in meaning from
'seeming'; they stand for <fxupt<rBcu as opposed to fto««i*.
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(2) Whenever we say that a thing only looks so and so, we are
really questioning some immediate judgment of perception. But
-this presupposes that, at least in certain cases, such judgments
are not to be questioned but give us things as they are. Thus the
assertion that the moon looks as large as the sun implies that
there is something in perception whioh suggests that the moon
is as large ; and this is only possible if, under certain oiro'umstanoes,
perception gives the real relative size. And under certain con-
ditions, it does so. If objects are equally distant from the observer,
perception successfully gives their relative size. If we thought
that there were no oiroumstances under whioh we should perceive
the real relative size, we could never assert that one object looks as
large as another. Similarly the statement that the stick looks
bent implies that, given oertain physical conditions, we should see the
true shape of objects. Ever in the case of perspective the same
thing is true. If we really mean that the roof of a building looks
converging towards the ground, we must allow that in the right
position we should see it as it really is, viz., horizontal. It may be
objected that the necessity of foreshortening renders this impossible.
But the answer is that if we admit the impossibility, we at once
reconsider our original assertion and maintain that after all the
roof does not look sloping.
(3) Our possession of the distinction between appearance and
reality and our power of determining in particular what is ap-
pearance and what is reality presuppose that we understand how
our apprehension of objeots is conditioned by relation to us as
observers. It is only because we know that our distance from an
object affeots its apparent size, that we can draw a distinction
between the size it looks and the size it is. If we forget this, we
can draw no distinction at all. The same knowledge is presupposed
by that power to discount difference of distance which enables us
to determine the real relative size of two objects. It is the same
in the case of refraction. To be able to say that a stick looks bent,
we must be aware that our perception is somehow physically con-
ditioned, and we can only determine its real shape if we know the
special nature of the physical conditions. Similarly it is because
we understand the conditions of perspective that we can discount
them and assert—if we do assert—that objeots look different in
shape from what they are in reality. Lastly it is precisely because
there are no such spatial relations between observer and observed
in the case of pain, that, with respect to it, no distinction between
reality and appearance can be drawn.
It follows that the distinction, as U3ed in our ordinary experience,
arises from the special nature of the spatial relation between the
object and the observer. Hence its application to knowledge in
general and in a different connexion should arouse suspicion.
To apply these results. The essential feature of the first theory
referred to, is that things suffer distortion in being presented to us.
Two kinds of attributes are* presupposed, those belonging to things
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•as they are in themselves, and those belonging to them as pro*
rented to us. And we know only the latter.
The falsity of the theory should now be obvious.
(1) Even if we allow the distinction between the attributes of
.things as they are in themselves and their attributes for us, we
are obliged to allow that we know the general nature of the former.
Accordingly we must know not only the detailed nature of the
attributes for us but also the general nature of the real attributes.
(2) The distinction just referred to is wholly false. There is no
suoh thing as an attribute of a thing as presented to us. All attri-
butes used in stating how things look are primarily applicable to
things as they are. The theory takes a distinction of detail and
converts it into one of general structure. And the preceding
-analysis, if successful, shows that the distinction between reality
and appearance presupposes that we at least know the general
nature of reality.
(3) It has been pointed out that to distinguish between reality
-and appearance, we -must be aware of and understand a speoial
spatial relation in which we stand to objects as observers. Suoh a
presupposition is excluded where the problem is the purely general
one of the relation of reality in general to us as peroipients.
It should now be possible to formulate more clearly what con-
stitutes (1) the plausibility of the theory in question, and (2) the
wrong step in the argument leading to it.
The plausibility is due to the real fact that in making use of
perception to judge of the nature of an object, we have to take
into account the special relation of the objeot to the perceiving
subject, and that consequently we must discount what we should
judge it to be, if we relied on the verdict of immediate perception.
This suggests that in knowing generally, we must discount an
-element which belongs to objects only in appearance through their
relation to a perceiving subject, i.e., that relation to a percipient
Affects for the percipient the general nature of reality as well as its
details.
The mistake in argument arises from a mis-statement of the
real fact. ' The moon looks as large as the sun' is taken to mean
' while I do not believe it is as large, I perceive it to be as large,
i'.e., for my perception it is as large'. The distinction between
what a thing looks and what it is has to be stated, and it is stated
by saying that for perception it is one thing, while in itself it is
another. Then perception being the only means of access to the
thing, it follows that we only know the thing as it is for perception.
But (1) the statement that something is so ' for perception' is
vicious in principle. An assertion claims to be the recognition of
objective fact, i.e., of what is. If the words' for perception' are signifi-
cant, they constitute a restriction ; they must mean' only for percep-
tion '. But the assertion that something is so only for perception
is a contradiction in terms. For perception is perception of what
is; it involves judgment and its formula is, ' we perceive something
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to be so and so'. And it is just this objectivity of perception which*
is the main factor in the transition from the view that we know
' things only as they appear' to the view that we know only
appearances. We hesitate to assert that objects are so and so for
perception and therefore transform this statement into another,
viz., that the appearances of objects are so and so. By making
the appearance into a new object, we gain a new and suitable sub-
ject of assertion because, as an appearance, it admits of no dis-
tinction between what it is and what it is for perception. The new
statement, however, is obviously false. Not only is the assertion'
' the look of the moon is not as large as the look of the sun ' not
the equivalent of' the moon looks as large as the sun' but it is not
sense. There is the same absence of meaning in the statement in
which Kant's view that space is a phenomenon ought to find
expression, viz., ' the look of tbings-in-themselves is spatial'.
(2) The statement ' the moon looks as large as the sun' is only
in appearance an assertion about present perception. It is not
true that I now perceive the moon to be as large as the sun. It ia
not so for my perception. For, as has already been urged, per-
ception implies the belief that what I perceive is as I perceive it.
The true meaning of the statement is, ' If I were to forget my
position as an observer, I should assert that I perceived the moon
to be as large'. The theory in question takes ' look ' to mean ' is
for perception,' which as opposed to what ' really is ' involves a
contradiction. ' Look' properly means ' would be perceived to be,
if certain conditions were forgotten '.
The proper way to describe the process of taking into account
the conditions under which we perceive, is to state it as a process
of ' discounting ' or ' correction'. We begin with an immediate
judgment of perception, ' I perceive the moon to be as large as the
sun'. Then reflexion on my position as an observer forces me to-
modify this judgment, and I assert, ' The sun is really larger, though
if I were to forget the difference of distance, I should say that I
saw it to be as large '. The point is that the immediate judgment
of perception does not ldmain side by side with the judgment that
corrects it. And only if it remained could I say, ' for my percep-
tion the moon is as large'.
The fact is that the hold of the phenomenalist view upon us
arises from the almost inexpugnable conviction that the distinction
between appearance and reality involves two distinct things, objects
and their appearances. It is this conviction which lends colour to-
the view that when we have discovered that something is not
really so and so, it still is so for perception. For it enables us to
assert that the appearance remains, even when we have discovered
that it is only an appearance.
Yet it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that there are
no such things as appearances at all. An appearance seems neces-
sarily to mean one of two things, either (1) a perception, or (2)
simply a sensuous image. In the former case a judgment is
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APPEABANCES AND BEAUTY. 229
involved, bat a jadgment which disappears npon reflexion on oar
positions as observers. In the latter case the desired result is not
gained even if we disregard the activity of thought necessary to
apprehend the image. For the image stands in no relation to the
objeot, except possibly as ite effect. And whatever it is, it is not
its appearance or the appearance of anything. And if that be so,
no distinction between reality and appearance remains. There are
two kinds of reality, objects without the mind and images within
it, and we know the one and we do not know the other. Lastly,
examination of instances leads us to the same result However
much I see an object distorted through bad glass or in reflexions,
it is the thing whioh I see. There is strictly speaking no ' look'
or ' image' of the thing; there is only the thing with its character-
istics distorted. The word ' look ' or ' appearance ' properly refers
to a judgment, and that not a jadgment I make now, but one
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